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Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.*
A principal strategic tactic of the Taliban . . . is either provoking or exploiting
civilian casualties.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates1
I. Introduction
Although he does not use the term “lawfare,” Secretary Gates’ observationreflects what is in reality one of the most common iterations of lawfare in
today’s conflicts. Specifically, the Taliban are aiming to achieve a particular military
effect, that is, the neutralization of US and allied technical superiority, especially
with respect to airpower. To do so they are, as Secretary Gates indicates, creating
the perception of violations of one of the fundamental norms of the law of armed
conflict (LOAC), that is, the distinction between combatants and civilians.
While “provoking or exploiting civilian casualties” is clearly a type of lawfare, it
is by no means its only form. Although the definition has evolved somewhat since
its modern interpretation was introduced in 2001,2 today I define it as “the strategy
of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve a warfighting objective.”3
As such, it is ideologically neutral, that is, it is best conceptualized much as a
weapon that can be wielded by either side in a belligerency. In fact, many uses of
legal “weapons” and methodologies avoid the need to resort to physical violence
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and other more deadly means. This is one reason, for example, that the United
States and other nations seek to use sanctions before resorting to the use of force
whenever possible.
Another illustration would be the use of a contract “weapon” during the early
part of Operation Enduring Freedom to purchase commercially available satellite
imagery of Afghanistan.4 This approach was equally or, perhaps, more effective than
other more traditional military means might have been in ensuring the imagery did
not fall into hostile hands. Additionally, most experts consider the re-establishment
of the rule of law as an indispensable element of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.
Finally, few debate that the use of legal processes to deconstruct terrorist financing
is an extraordinarily important part of countering violent extremists.
In short, there are many uses of what might be called “lawfare” that serve to re-
duce the destructiveness of conflicts, and therefore further one of the fundamental
purposes of the law of war. All of that said, others have given the concept a rather
different meaning. Some couch it in terms of what is alleged to be the “growing use
of international law claims, usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool of war.”5
Similarly, the privately run Lawfare Project openly acknowledges it concentrates
“on the negative manipulation of international and national human rights laws”
for purposes, it asserts, that are “other than, or contrary to, that for which those
laws were originally enacted.”6
Some go even further. In 2007 respected lawyer-writer Scott Horton expressed
concern that unnamed “lawfare theorists” purportedly consider that attorneys
who aggressively use the courts in the representation of Guantanamo detainees
and other terrorism-related matters “might as well be terrorists themselves.”7
More recently, much discussion of lawfare has centered on legal maneuvering as-
sociated with the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. For example, some individuals
and organizations see lawfare as “the latest manifestation in the sixty-year cam-
paign to isolate the State of Israel.”8
In any event, these sometimes hyperbolic permutations on lawfare theories are
not that espoused by this article. Among other things, it is certainly not the view of
this writer that any party legitimately using the courts is doing anything improper.
Instead, this brief article will focus more narrowly on the role of law in contempo-
rary conflicts, principally that in Afghanistan.
It is true, as Secretary Gates’ comment suggests, that lawfare in the Afghan
context has typically taken the form of the manipulation of civilian casualties to
make it appear that US and allied forces have somehow violated legal or ethical
norms. Thus, it could be said that lawfare itself is an asymmetrical form of war-
fare, one that is value-based and that seeks to outflank, so to speak, conventional
military means.
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Regardless, from this writer’s perspective, the use of the term “lawfare” was al-
ways intended as a means of encapsulating for non-lawyer, military audiences the
meaning of law in today’s war. It was not intended to fit neatly into some political
science construct. Rather, the sobriquet of “lawfare” was meant to impress upon
military audiences and other non-lawyers that law is more than just a legal and
moral imperative; it is a practical and pragmatic imperative intimately associated
with mission success. In that respect, the growth of the term seems to have had
some positive results.
II. Lawfare Today: Airpower and Civilian Casualties
Perhaps no aspect of what this writer would characterize as lawfare is more promi-
nent than the restrictive rules of engagement imposed upon allied forces in Af-
ghanistan in an effort to win “hearts and minds” by limiting civilian casualties.
These restrictions go far beyond what LOAC requires, and are a classic example of
efforts to “improve upon” LOAC via policymaking that insufficiently appreciates
unintended consequences that can have, at the end of the day, decidedly counter-
productive results. As a noncommissioned officer explained to columnist George
Will in June of 2010, the rules of engagement in Afghanistan are “too prohibitive
for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical success.”9 And other troops fight-
ing there have raised similar concerns.
Airpower in particular has been cast—wrongly in my view—as a villain with re-
spect to the civilian casualty issue. The Army and Marine Corps’ COIN Field Man-
ual (FM) 3-24,10 for example, discourages the use of the air weapon by claiming
that “[b]ombing, even with the most precise weapons, can cause unintended civil-
ian casualties.”11 Of course, any weapon “can” cause civilian casualties,12 so it is not
clear why air-delivered munitions should be singled out for “exceptional care,” as
FM 3-24 demands.
More important, the data show that ground operations can be vastly more dan-
gerous to civilians than airstrikes. A study by the New England Journal of Medicine
found that fewer than 5 percent of civilian casualties in Iraq during the 2003–8 time
frame were the result of airstrikes.13 Regarding Afghanistan, a 2008 Human Rights
Watch study of airstrikes found that it was the presence of troops on the ground
that created the most risk to civilians, as the “vast majority of known civilian
deaths” came from airstrikes called in by ground forces under insurgent attack.14
Even more recently, a National Bureau of Economic Research study found that
only 6 percent of the civilian deaths attributed to International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) were the result of airstrikes. In fact, traffic accidents with ISAF vehicles
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were two and a half times more likely to be the cause of the deaths of Afghan
women and children than were airstrikes.
Nevertheless, ground commanders have insisted that civilian deaths could be
curtailed with more troops. Army Brigadier General Michael Tucker suggested as
much when he told USA Today in late 2008 that “[i]f we got more boots on the
ground, we would not have to rely as much on [airstrikes].”15 Unsurprisingly,
therefore, when General Stanley McChrystal assumed command in Afghanistan in
June of 2009, he immediately issued orders that significantly restricted the use of the
air weapon,16 and shortly thereafter called for a “surge” of mainly ground forces.17
It should be said that even before General McChrystal’s orders the coalition’s
ability to use the air weapon was complicated by NATO’s own public pro-
nouncements that distorted the understanding of the law of war, with tragic con-
sequences.18 Specifically, in June of 2007 NATO declared that its forces “would not
fire on positions if it knew there were civilians nearby.”19 A year later its statement
was even more egregious, when a NATO spokesman preened that “[i]f there is the
likelihood of even one civilian casualty, we will not strike, not even if we think
Osama bin Laden is down there.”20
This statement was not only insensitive to Americans cognizant of the horror of
the bin Laden–inspired 9/11 attacks; it also works counter to the basic purposes of
LOAC. Of course, zero casualties are not what LOAC requires; rather, it only de-
mands that they not be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.
The law is this way for good reason: if “zero casualties” were the standard, it would
invite adversaries to keep themselves in the company of civilians to create a sanctu-
ary from attack. The Taliban heard NATO’s invitation and did exactly that.21
In any event, if the intent of the June 2009 airpower restrictions was to save civil-
ian lives, it did not succeed. Although civilian deaths from the actions of NATO
forces did decline,22 overall civilian deaths in Afghanistan nevertheless reached an
all-time high in 2009.23 And civilian deaths soared 31 percent in 2010 over 2009’s
record-breaking figures. I would suggest that an obvious (albeit unintended) result
of forgoing opportunities to kill extremists via airstrikes is that they live another
day to kill more innocents.24
This may be why the UN reported on June 19, 2010—about a year after General
McChrystal’s order—that security in Afghanistan has “deteriorated markedly” in
recent months.25 Moreover, in terms of “winning hearts and minds,” analyst Lara M.
Dadkhah raises the interesting point worth pondering in a February 2010 New
York Times op-ed that the “premise that dead civilians are harmful to the conduct
of the war [is mistaken, as] no past war has ever supplied compelling proof of that
claim.”26 That is proving to be the case in Afghanistan.
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To his credit, General McChrystal did admit in December 2009 that there was
“much about Afghanistan that [he] did not fully understand.”27 In that respect, his
assumption that seems to underlie his order—that civilian deaths inevitably work
against the perpetrators’ cause—may be one of the things he did not correctly un-
derstand. For example, Ben Arnoldy of the Christian Science Monitor reports that
the Taliban—not NATO forces—were responsible for the majority of civilian
deaths in 2009.28 Even though those deaths reflect a 41 percent increase over 2008,
Arnoldy says that “there is little indication these Taliban indiscretions have back-
fired on the movement so far.”29
Consider as well the Afghan reaction in September of 2009 when General
McChrystal sought to apologize for the bombing of a hijacked oil tanker near
Kunduz that allegedly killed seventy-two Afghans. The Washington Post reports
that when General McChrystal began to apologize, a local “council chairman,
Ahmadullah Wardak, cut him off” with demands for a tougher approach.30
“McChrystal,” the Post recounts, “seemed to be caught off guard [by Wardak’s re-
proof]” as Wardak asserted that the allies have been “too nice to the thugs.”31
Jeremy Shapiro, a Brookings Institution scholar who served on a civilian assess-
ment team for General McChrystal, analyzes Wardak’s remarks as saying that if the
coalition is going to be a genuine provider of security for the people, that means:
“[Y]ou’ll do what is necessary to establish control, and the very attention that the
coalition pays to civilian casualties actually creates the impression among many Af-
ghans that [coalition forces] in fact are not interested in establishing control and
not interested in being the provider of security.”32 Shapiro concedes that the
Afghan government has “highlighted” the civilian casualty issue but argues that it
is doing so “because it serves to demonstrate [its] independence from the coalition
and gives [it] leverage with the coalition.”33 To his surprise, Shapiro says, local of-
ficials in his experience “tend actually not to be too concerned” with the civilian
casualties.34 In short, he concludes that while the civilian casualty issue “clearly
resonates very strongly [in the United States] and in Europe . . . [it is] not clear
that Afghans actually see this as a key issue.”35
A Gallup poll released in February 2010 provides further data as to Afghan per-
ceptions. Although the question of airstrikes was not directly addressed, it did
show that beginning in June of 2009 (coinciding with the new restrictions on
airpower) through the end of the survey period in late 2009, Afghans’ approval of
US leadership in Afghanistan declined, as did their support for additional troops.36
Obviously, the restrictions on airpower did not have the hoped-for “hearts and
minds” effect. Further complicating the issue is the fact that, like those of Afghan
civilians, coalition casualties also reached an all-time high in 2009.37 And these dis-
turbing casualty trends are continuing into 2010; by the end of September the
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number of coalition casualties exceeded the record-breaking high of 2009.38 Thus,
however well-intentioned the airpower restrictions may have been, evidence of
their efficacy is not apparent.
The deleterious effect on operations is unmistakable, as the deteriorating secu-
rity situation noted in the UN report above attests.39 At one time Taliban fighters
cowered at American airpower.40 Today, however, the Air Force Times reports that
because of the new directive, the Taliban “no longer run and hide when they see a
fighter jet overhead.”41 The Times quotes an Air Force pilot as expressing frustra-
tion “when you can see them shooting at our guys” and are obliged not to attack.42
The pilot laments that the enemy knows that “we are not allowed to engage in cer-
tain situations.”43
At the same time airpower technology continues to develop even more discrete
and effective ways to hunt the terrorists without the need to put thousands of
young Americans in harm’s way. According to the Washington Post, “a new genera-
tion of small but highly accurate missiles” designed to limit collateral damage is be-
ing fielded for employment on remotely manned vehicles.44 Such technology, the
Post reports, along with better intelligence, has caused the “clamor over [drone]
strikes [to have] died down considerably over the last year.”45
While airpower alone is not—and can never be—the whole solution to today’s
wars, rethinking it in the context of what today’s technology can provide might
produce opportunities to fulfill the President’s intent of protecting Americans
against terrorist attack in a less resource-demanding way,46 and at the same time
serve the interests of international humanitarian law’s effort to ameliorate the hor-
ror of war, and especially its impact on innocent civilians.
III. Lawfare Tomorrow: The Emerging Issues
The increasing controversy concerning “drones,” or, more accurately, remotely pi-
loted vehicles (RPVs), is raising some interesting legal and policy issues with
lawfare implications. By all reports, these weapon systems are extremely effective,
particularly in eroding enemy leadership cadres. Yet a variety of objections have
been offered as to their use.
Some of the attacks border on the absurd, and are reminiscent of medieval legal
debates. For example, in A.D. 1139 Pope Innocent II and the Second Lateran
Council condemned the missile warfare that was devastating Europe’s knighted ar-
istocracy by calling slingers and archers “dastards” that are practicing a “deadly
and God-detested art” with their stones and arrows.47 Fast-forward to 2009, and
we find former Australian Army officer David Kilcullen condemning the missile
warfare that is devastating the terrorist aristocracy of the Taliban and Al Qaeda by
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telling Congress to “call off the drones” in part because the militants view aerial at-
tacks as “cowardly and weak.”48
It is not clear why anyone should be concerned about the sensibilities of Taliban
and Al Qaeda militants. Although Kilcullen and others seem to view the militants
as courageous fighters seeking man-to-man fights, their use of indiscriminate im-
provised explosive devices—which grew 94 percent over the past year49—plainly
shows that they embrace remotely operated systems (albeit on the ground and not
in the air). In addition, reports indicate that the Taliban are not only intermingling
with civilians in the hopes of being shielded; media reports also say they are engag-
ing in the vile practice of buying children to use as suicide bombers.50
Almost as problematic as the “cowardly” objections to advanced warfighting
systems is the emergence of the “targeted killings” debate. This has become some-
thing of a cottage industry within the human rights establishment. Many commen-
tators seem to be frantically searching for ways to find the use of the highly effective
RPVs somehow improper. A good example is the recent report of the UN’s Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.51
One of the most disappointing aspects of the report was the allegation that RPV
operators might adopt a “Playstation mentality.” This wholly speculative and un-
proven allegation questioning the professionalism of RPV operators is but one il-
lustration of the report’s deficiencies. Moreover, the illogical suggestion that
military or intelligence professionals would prefer to kill a terrorist as opposed to
capturing and interrogating him is yet another indication of the report’s flaws.
Yet there are issues associated with RPVs. For example, in a recent issue of
Armed Forces Journal, Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution raises issues about
the status of RPV operators by questioning the propriety of the operation of the
aircraft by other than military personnel.52 Perhaps as interesting—or more so—is
the question of fully autonomous RPVs or other weapon systems.
As a practical matter, the current generation of RPVs generally requires a very
permissive air environment to survive. To use the systems in contested airspace
presents a variety of daunting technical challenges that must be overcome, not the
least of which is the maintenance of continuous contact between the vehicle and its
distant operator. Many experts believe that in the future the vehicle would have to
operate autonomously, at least part of the time.
The world has not, however, been receptive to autonomous weapons systems.
Exhibit “A” would be the near-universal ban on landmines we have today. When
one examines the history of the ban, it becomes clear that emotional arguments
predominated as opposed to tempered, rational discussions of how the weapons
might be used in ways that actually reduce the destructiveness of war. Regardless,
the experience of the landmine campaign may be something of a portent for
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policymakers to consider, as science will inevitably provide the opportunity for the
development of a whole family of partly or even fully autonomous weapons sys-
tems for use in air, land, sea and cyber domains.
IV. Concluding Observations
Any discussion of lawfare seems to invite conclusions that “the law” is somehow an
impediment to successfully warfighting, especially in an era of irregular warfare
waged by non-State actors.53 It is true, as mentioned earlier in this article, that there
certainly will always be those who will abuse the law for perverse purposes. That
should not, however, suggest abandoning the law. Consider the thoughtful obser-
vations of Lawrence Siskind in response to the “lawfare” strategies of Hamas lev-
eled at Israel:
When al-Qaeda terrorists used jet planes as weapons to crash into skyscrapers in 2001,
the West did not abandon its airports and office buildings. Instead, it found ways to
cope with danger without making fundamental changes to its business life. The fact
that Hamas terrorists are cynically using another Western institution, the rule of law, as
a weapon today does not mean that Western nations should abandon it. Instead, they
must learn to adjust and cope.54
In the twenty-first century we should expect to see further developments of
lawfare. We may not like all of its iterations, but we should never forget that legal
battles are always preferable to real battles, and modern democracies are well-
suited to wage—and win—legal “wars.”
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